000			03586nam a22003858i 4500
001			CR9781316212851
005			20250919142043.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			140919s2015||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781316212851 (ebook)
020			_z9781107103047 (hardback)
020			_z9781107501225 (paperback)
050	0	0	_aRA395.D44 _bS45 2015
082	0	0	_a362.1/0425091724 _223
100	1		_aSelway, Joel, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aCoalitions of the wellbeing : _bhow electoral rules and ethnic politics shape health policy in developing countries / _cJoel Sawat Selway, Brigham Young University.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2015.
300			_a1 online resource (xiii, 292 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Part I: 1. Ethnic diversity or institutions? The source of public goods underprovision; 2. Background and definitions; 3. A socio-institutional theory of public goods provision; 4. Testing the theory: health and education outcomes in developing democracies; Part II. Electoral Rules and Health in Low Ethnic-Salience Countries: 5. Thailand: a new constitution and the introduction of universal healthcare; 6. Single-member districts and medium-sized majority groups: Botswana and New Zealand; Part III. Electoral Rules and Health in High Ethnic-Salience, Ethno-Geographically Intermixing Countries: 7. Mauritius: diversity and the success of majoritarian electoral rules; 8. Malaysia: single-member districts, multi-ethnic parties and health; Part IV. Electoral Rules in High Ethnic-Salience, Ethno-Geographically Isolated Countries: 9. Electoral rules and multiethnic parties in Burma's democratic era (1948-62); 10. Indonesia as a solution for ethno-geographically isolated societies; Part V. Conclusion.
520			_aWhy do some developing countries have more efficient health systems and better health outcomes? Contrary to existing theory that posits the superiority of proportional representation (PR) rules on public-goods provision, this book argues that electoral rules function differently given the underlying ethnic structure. In countries with low ethnic salience, PR has the same positive effect as in past theories. In countries with high ethnic salience, the geographic distribution of ethnic groups further matters: where they are intermixed, PR rules are worse for health outcomes; where they are isolated, neither rule is superior. The theory is supported through a combination of careful analysis of electoral reform in individual country cases with numerous well-designed cross-country comparisons. The case studies include Thailand, Mauritius, Malaysia, Botswana, Burma and Indonesia. The theory has broad implications for electoral rule design and suggests a middle ground in the debate between the Consociational and Centripetal schools of thought.
650		0	_aHealth care reform _zDeveloping countries.
650		0	_aMedical policy _zDeveloping countries.
650		0	_aMedical care _xPolitical aspects.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781107103047
856	4	0	_uhttps://eresourcesptsl.ukm.remotexs.co/user/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316212851
907			_a.b16845304 _b2022-10-13 _c2020-12-22
942			_n0
998			_a1 _b2020-12-22 _cm _da _feng _genk _y0 _z.b16845304
999			_c651873 _d651873