000			03894nam a2200469 i 4500
005			20250919011708.0
008			160405s2013 enka b 001 0 eng
020			_a9781107026520 _qhardback _cRM353.30
020			_a1107026520 _qhardback
039		9	_a201607011002 _basrul _c201606281603 _dhamka _c201606210801 _dhamudah _y04-05-2016 _zhamudah
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dDLC _dUKM _erda
043			_acl-----
090			_aJL966.N447
090			_aJL966 _b.N447
100	1		_aNegretto, Gabriel L. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aMaking constitutions : _bpresidents, parties, and institutional choice in Latin America / _cGabriel L. Negretto, Division of Political Studies, Centro de Investigaci y Docencia Econicas.
264		1	_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2013.
264			_c©2013.
300			_axii, 283 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm.
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 263-277) and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Part I. The Logic of Constitutional Choice: Theory and Data: 1. Constitutional change and patterns of design; 2. A two-level theory of constitutional choice; 3. Determinants of variation in constitutional choice; Part II. Case Studies: The Origins of Reforms: 4. Constitutional change as a means to consolidate power: Argentina 1949; 5. Constitutional change as a strategy to redistribute power: Argentina 1994; 6. Constitutional change as a response to state failure: Colombia 1991; 7. Constitutional change as a remedy for ungovernability: Ecuador 1998.
520			_a'Negretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic interests of the actors who have influence over institutional selection. The book explains how governance problems shape the general guidelines for reform, while strategic calculations and power resources affect the selection of specific alternatives of design. It emphasizes the importance of events that trigger reform and the designers' level of electoral uncertainty for understanding the relative impact of short-term partisan interests on constitution writing. Negretto's study challenges predominant theories of institutional choice and paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change'-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aRepresentative government and representation _zLatin America _xHistory _y20th century.
650		0	_aConstitutional history _zLatin America _xHistory _y20th century.
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / General. _2bisacsh
651		0	_aLatin America _xPolitics and government _y20th century.
856	4	2	_3Contributor biographical information _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1302/2012036792-b.html
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1302/2012036792-d.html
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1302/2012036792-t.html
907			_a.b16301523 _b2019-11-12 _c2019-11-12
942			_c01 _n0 _kJL966.N447
914			_avtls003603521
949			_o100967448
990			_ahamka
991			_aFakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan
998			_at _b2016-05-04 _cm _da _feng _genk _y0 _z.b16301523
999			_c607708 _d607708