000			03289nam a22003614a 4500
005			20250918164830.0
008			120712s2009 mau b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780262012737 (hbk.)
020			_a9780262516631 _cRM58.24
039		9	_a201207251134 _brosli _y07-12-2012 _zmazarita
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC _dUKM
090			_aB808.9.T934
090			_aB808.9 _b.T934
100	1		_aTye, Michael.
245	1	0	_aConsciousness revisited : _bmaterialism without phenomenal concepts / _cMichael Tye.
260			_aCambridge, MA : _bMIT Press, _c2009.
300			_axiv, 229 p. ; _c24 cm.
490	0		_aRepresentation and mind series
500			_a'A Bradford book.'
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.
650		0	_aConsciousness.
650		0	_aPhenomenology.
650		0	_aMaterialism.
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0824/2008030920.html
907			_a.b15427651 _b2019-11-12 _c2019-11-12
942			_c01 _n0 _kB808.9.T934
914			_avtls003507941
990			_ark4
991			_aFakulti Sains Sosial dan Kemanusiaan
998			_at _b2012-12-07 _cm _da _feng _gmau _y0 _z.b15427651
999			_c526147 _d526147