TY  - BOOK
AU  - Rogers,James R.
AU  - Flemming,Roy B.
AU  - Bond,Jon R.
TI  - Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court
SN  - 0813925274 (cloth : alk. paper)
PY  - 2006///
CY  - Charlottesville
PB  - University of Virginia Press
KW  - United States
KW  - Supreme Court
KW  - Congress
KW  - Powers and duties
KW  - Separation of powers
KW  - Political questions and judicial power
N1  - Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-313) and index; Strategic games with Congress and the states -- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin -- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers -- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn --'John Marshall has made his decision' : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg -- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers -- Strategic games within the judicial hierarchy -- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan -- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser -- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson -- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire -- Afterword : studying courts formally / Lawrence Baum -- Appendix: a primer on game theory / James R. Rogers
UR  - http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip062/2005029109.html
ER  -