The political economy of the United Nations Security Council : money and influence / James Raymond Vreeland, Georgetown University, Axel Dreher, Heidelberg University.

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Money and politics on the international stage -- A theory of Trading Security Council votes for aid -- Examples of punishments, threats, and rewards -- Who wins election to represent the world? -- Statistical evidence of trading finance for favors -- Consequences of politically motivated foreign aid -- Reforming the UNSC.

Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of government. Not surprisingly, governments themselves trade money for political support on the international stage. Strange, however, is the tale of this book. For, in this study, legitimacy stands as the central political commodity at stake. The book investigates the ways governments trade money for favors at the United Nations Security Council - the body endowed with the international legal authority to legitimize the use of armed force to maintain or restore peace. With a wealth of quantitative data, the book shows that powerful countries, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, extend financial favors to the elected members of the Security Council through direct foreign aid and through international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In return, developing countries serving on the Security Council must deliver their political support ... or face the consequences.